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[1279] 
The Water Is Coming: How Policies for Internally 
Displaced Persons Can Shape the U.S. Response to 
Sea Level Rise and the Redistribution of the 
American Population 
KELLY CARSON† 
Roughly forty percent of the United States population lives in an area threatened to be underwater 
by 2100 due to climate change. There are little to no infrastructural and policy frameworks to 
handle this problem. This Note explores existing U.S. frameworks for disaster response—namely, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), 
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—as well as early-stage 
initiatives to relocate entire communities within the United States. It then examines domestic and 
international policies for handling internally displaced persons (IDPs), including the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy and Implementation Guidelines, 
and the Kampala Convention. The Note then suggests specific applications of these policy 
frameworks to the issue of environmentally displaced persons (EDPs) in the United States, finding 
that a more proactive approach including codified liability for private actors, economic incentives 
for retreat, and a centralized agency to handle EDPs will provide the United States with a strong 
foundation to handle the unique challenges facing the growing number of EDPs within its 
borders.   
 
 † J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law Class; Senior Production 
Editor, Hastings Law Journal. Special thank you to Professor David Takacs for his tireless commitment to his 
students and to the environment. I am a better scholar for having worked with him. Further thanks to my 
classmates at Hastings whose thoughtful reflections enriched the writing process for this Note. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Densely populated coastal areas susceptible to rising sea levels are home 
to about forty percent of the U.S. population.1 As a result, scientists predict 
massive population displacement of millions of Americans along the coasts in 
the coming decades, with reverberating impacts on inland areas.2 The United 
States is unprepared for this crisis. In fact, the effects of sea level rise have 
already begun to permanently displace large numbers of Americans from their 
homes,3 disproportionally affecting indigenous communities.4 This problem 
requires an immediate, thorough, and proactive response. 
This Note addresses how U.S. disaster relief and relocation policies can be 
improved to accommodate the unique and growing needs of environmentally 
displaced persons (EDPs).5 It will reveal how the United States has failed to 
meet its responsibilities under the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement in regard to its treatment of EDPs, who should receive the same 
protections as IDPs. It will also reveal how policy directives from the U.N. 
Guiding Principles and the African Union Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa should factor into U.S. 
policy towards EDPs. This Note will demonstrate that the United States should 
take a proactive approach to the relocation and reintegration of EDPs, including 
economic stimulus incentives, the creation of an agency dedicated to the 
protection and treatment of EDPs, the codification of liability for private actors 
who have contributed to sea level rise and population displacement, and 
expansive centralized reporting on equity issues in relocation initiatives. 
Part I will provide a detailed discussion about projected sea level rise and 
population displacement. Part II will describe the limited infrastructure and 
reactive nature of current U.S. policies addressing coastal retreat and disaster 
relief. Part III will explain existing national and international policy frameworks 
for the treatment of internally displaced persons (IDPs)—persons displaced 
within their own country by violence, human rights violations, or disaster,6 
 
 1. Is Sea Level Rising?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ 
sealevel.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 2. See Mathew E. Hauer, Migration Induced by Sea-Level Rise Could Reshape the US Population 
Landscape, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 321, 321 (2017). 
 3. See infra Part II (discussing displacement related to both major weather events and progressive sea 
level rise). 
 4. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing protection of indigenous communities). 
 5. EDPs “are people ‘who are displaced from or who feel obligated to leave their usual place of residence 
because their lives, livelihoods and welfare have been placed at serious risk as a result of adverse environmental, 
ecological or climate processes and events.’” Casey B. McCormack, America’s Next Refugee Crisis: 
Environmentally Displaced Persons, 32 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 8, 9 (2018) (quoting CAMILLO BOANO, ROGER 
ZETTER & TIM MORRIS, REFUGEE STUD. CTR., ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, LIVELIHOODS AND FORCED MIGRATION 8 (2008), 
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/pb1-environmentally-displaced-people-2008.pdf). 
 6. See U.N. Off. for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affs., Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, at 1, U.N. Doc. OCHA/IDP/2004/01 (Oct. 2004),  https://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.pdf 
[hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles]; infra Part III (discussing the definition of IDPs). 
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drawing parallels between EDPs and IDPs. Part IV will then explain how 
national and international policy regarding IDPs gives strong insight into how 
the United States should address EDPs within its borders.  
 I.  SEA LEVEL RISE AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
On average, sea levels rose between eight and nine inches between 1880 
and the present, with roughly a third of that occurring since 1993.7 The effects 
of global warming, coinciding with a major acceleration of greenhouse gas 
emissions since the 1990s, have contributed to the melting of ice sheets and 
glaciers as well as the thermal expansion of existing ocean water.8 The oceans 
absorb over ninety percent of heat increases in the Earth’s atmosphere caused 
by the emission of greenhouse gases,9 and sea levels are projected to rise 
between 12 inches and 8.2 feet above 2000 levels by 2100, depending on the 
rate of greenhouse gas emissions in the immediate future.10 If global emissions 
trends remain the same as they are today, carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
Earth’s atmosphere will more than triple over preindustrial levels by 2100, with 
catastrophic effects on sea level rise.11 
As a result of rising sea levels, coastal areas are already experiencing more 
frequent nuisance flooding and more devastating storm surge.12 As sea levels 
rise, the average height of high tide in coastal areas and seasonal king tides—the 
highest tides of the year—become more disruptive.13 Eventually, daily high tides 
will rise as high as king tides.14 In many susceptible areas, high tide flooding 
occurred twice as often between May 2019 and April 2020 when compared to 
the same period in 2000 to 2001.15 Moreover, high tide flooding is expected to 
develop into a chronic, rather than a sporadic issue.16  
Rising sea levels, compounded by the effects of high tide flooding and 
storm surge during major weather events, have affected large numbers of 
 
 7. Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Global Sea Level, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 
25, 2021), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Is Sea Level Rising?, supra note 1. 
 10. Lindsey, supra note 7. 
 11. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with 
Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968 (2004). 
 12. Is Sea Level Rising?, supra note 1. 
 13. King Tides and Climate Change, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cre/king-tides-and-
climate-change (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 14. Id. 
 15. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 2019 STATE OF U.S. HIGH TIDE FLOODING WITH A 2020 
OUTLOOK, at v (2020), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/Techrpt_092_2019_State_of_US_High_ 
Tide_Flooding_with_a_2020_Outlook_30June2020.pdf [hereinafter 2019 STATE OF U.S. HIGH TIDE 
FLOODING]; see also NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 2018 STATE OF U.S. HIGH TIDE FLOODING WITH 
A 2019 OUTLOOK (2019), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/Techrpt_090_2018_State_of_US_ 
HighTideFlooding_with_a_2019_Outlook_Final.pdf. 
 16. See 2019 STATE OF  U.S. HIGH TIDE FLOODING, supra note 15, at 12. 
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Americans, displacing both individual families and entire communities.17 Since 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, America has seen a large number of 
internal EDPs. Historically destructive Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita in 
2005 led to the migration of over a million people from the Gulf Coast, 
Louisiana, and Texas.18 The unprecedented flooding, evacuation, and loss of life 
resulting from these storms coincided with the rapid acceleration of sea level 
rise near the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century.19 
Historians likened the “disaster-spurred migration” to the migration resulting 
from the Dust Bowl during the 1930s.20 After Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto 
Rico in 2017, over 100,000 people left the island after just five months, with 
experts predicting that as much as half of the island’s population will follow.21 
Subtropical Storm Theta, the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season’s 29th named 
storm, broke the 2005 record of twenty-eight named storms in one season.22  
Increasingly devastating hurricanes are not the only aspect of climate 
related sea level rise causing displacement. Entire coastal communities across 
the United States are facing permanent displacement due to the effects of 
progressive sea level rise.23 Louisiana’s Isle de Jean Charles, a Native American 
island community connected to the mainland by a single, frequently flooded 
road, has seen a ninety-eight percent loss of land since 1955.24 Isle de Jean 
Charles, along with at least seventeen other (largely Native American or 
Alaskan) communities, are attempting to relocate entire populations as the sea 
consumes their localities, making them uninhabitable.25 On the eastern coast of 
the United States, Virginia’s Tangier Island has seen two-thirds of its land 
disappear to sea level rise and coastal erosion.26 Experts predict that the entire 
island will fall to the sea over the next fifty years, displacing almost five hundred 
 
 17. See Michael Isaac Stein, How to Save a Town from Rising Waters, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2018, 8:00 
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-save-a-town-from-rising-waters/. 
 18. McCormack, supra note 5, at 10. 
 19. See id. at 9–10. 
 20. Id. (quoting Petula Dvorak, As Hurricane Harvey Slams Texas, a Look at the Most Devastating Storms 
in U.S. History, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
retropolis/wp/2017/08/25/as-texas-braces-for-a-huge-hurricane-a-look-at-the-most-devastating-storms-in-u-s-
history/). 
 21. Id. at 12. 
 22. Emily Shapiro & Daniel Manzo, How the 2020 Hurricane Season Just Set a New Record, ABC NEWS 
(Nov. 10, 2020, 5:51 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/2020-hurricane-season-set-record/story?id=73168263; 
see also Jonathan Erdman, Eta Becomes the Record-Tying 28th Storm in the 2020 Atlantic Hurricane Season, 
WEATHER CHANNEL (Nov. 2, 2020), https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/2020-10-05-atlantic-hurricane-
season-nearing-2005-record-storms; Allison Chinchar, All the Ways Hurricane Delta Is a Historic Storm, CNN 
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/07/weather/historic-storm-hurricane-delta/index.html. Storms are 
named if they become strong enough to qualify as a tropical storm. What Are Hurricanes?, NASA (Sept. 3, 
2014), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/nasa-knows/what-are-hurricanes-k4.html. 
 23. See Stein, supra note 17. 
 24. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing Isle de Jean Charles). 
 25. See Stein, supra note 17; see also McCormack, supra note 5, at 8. 
 26. McCormack, supra note 5, at 11; see also infra Part II.B.4 (discussing Tangier Island). 
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people.27 Similarly, scientists predict that, “even if humanity were to stop all 
[sea-level rise inducing] carbon emissions today, at least 414 towns, villages, 
and cities across the country would face relocation.”28 
According to some studies, over thirteen million Americans might be 
susceptible to sea level induced migration by 2100.29 According to scholar 
Mathew Hauer, displacement is “likely to have profound effects on future 
population landscapes,” drastically reshaping the national population 
distribution.30 The coming decades will likely see “hundreds of thousands of 
homes on US coasts” inundated with chronic floods.31 By 2100, if global 
greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting sea level rise are not drastically 
mitigated, “southern Florida, chunks of North Carolina and Virginia, much of 
Boston, [and] all but a sliver of New Orleans” will be consumed by the sea.32 
More and more powerful hurricanes will continue to plague those coastal areas 
remaining above water.33  
The resulting effects of migration will not only be felt on the coasts, but 
also in inland areas “unprepared to accommodate this wave of coastal 
migrants.”34 Studies suggest that the western half of the country will see a 
population increase of over ten percent in the next fifty years.35 While those with 
the means to relocate will likely do so on a rolling basis, others may become 
“trapped” with dwindling resources, creating subsections of “involuntar[ily] 
immobi[le]” populations.36 The vast majority of urban centers across the United 
States will likely feel the impact of the migration.37 “The sheer magnitude of 
places affected” will leave “no state . . . untouched.”38 Despite the imminence of 
this problem, “infrastructure challenges of accommodating millions 
 
 27. McCormack, supra note 5, at 11. 
 28. Stein, supra note 17. 
 29. Hauer, supra note 2, at 321. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Oliver Milman, ‘We’re Moving to Higher Ground’: America’s Era of Climate Mass Migration Is 
Here, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/24/americas-era-of-
climate-mass-migration-is-here. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Hauer, supra note 2, at 321. 
 35. Milman, supra note 31 (citing Qin Fan, Karen Fisher-Vanden & H. Allen Klaiber, Climate Change, 
Migration, and Regional Economic Impacts in the United States, 5 J. ASS’N ENV’T & RES. ECONOMISTS 643 
(2018)). The figures from this study include projections of Americans who will be displaced by other climate 
related events such as a decrease in the arability of farmland in the Midwest. See id.  
 36. Hauer, supra note 2, at 324. 
 37. Id. at 323 (discussing migration impacts on Core Based Statistical Areas); see also Core-Based 
Statistical Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/housing/housing-patterns/about/core-
based-statistical-areas.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2021)). Core-Based Statistical Areas, defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget, represent urban areas with adjacent territories with “a high degree of social and 
economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties.” Id.  
 38. Hauer, supra note 2, at 324. 
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of . . . migrants in largely unprepared inland municipalities is virtually 
unexplored.”39 
II.  CURRENT U.S. FRAMEWORK: DISASTER RESPONSE AND COMMUNITY 
RELOCATION 
America’s current framework for handling climate related displacement 
falls mostly within the category of disaster response, a largely reactive system 
that historically has only responded after a major weather event has already 
occurred.40 There have been a handful of federally funded relocation projects for 
some coastal communities, a more proactive approach to moving whole 
populations from areas immediately threatened by sea level rise.41 Neither of 
these models for relocation are equipped to adequately address the needs of an 
already large number of people facing permanent displacement. Below, I will 
describe these disaster recovery and community relocation models as they exist 
today. 
A. DISASTER RESPONSE  
The federal disaster response framework consists of four main 
components: the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) buyout and 
support programs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
insurance and grant programs, the Small Business Administration (SBA) relief 
loans, and the National Flood Insurance Program. 
1. FEMA Buyout Program 
Under the Stafford Act, which governs disaster relief and emergency 
assistance,42 FEMA is the primary federal entity responsible for coordinating 
emergency disaster relief.43 FEMA responds after a formal request from a state, 
tribe, territory or insular area,44 and an emergency declaration from the 
president.45 FEMA assists local jurisdictions in rebuilding infrastructure, 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. See Tim McDonnell, The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention to, NPR: GOATS & SODA (June 
20, 2018, 11:25 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-
the-world-barely-pays-attention-to. 
 41. See Stein, supra note 17; see also Rachel Waldholz, Newtok to Congress: Thank You for Saving Our 
Village, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2018/03/27/newtok-to-congress-
thank-you-for-saving-our-village/. 
 42. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2018). 
 43. Rocio Cara Labrador & Amelia Cheatham, U.S. Disaster Relief at Home and Abroad, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-disaster-relief-home-and-abroad (Sept. 21, 2020). FEMA 
operates under the Secretary of Homeland Security. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RECOVERY 
FRAMEWORK 35 (4th ed. 2019), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/NRF_FINALApproved_ 
2011028.pdf. 
 44. Natural Disaster Response and Recovery, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/recovery 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 45. Labrador & Cheatham, supra note 43. 
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providing emergency housing, and offering financial assistance.46 The Agency 
also offers some tailored support to individuals and families affected by 
presidentially-declared disasters.47  
Significant for the purposes of this Note, FEMA also administers a 
managed retreat program through which local officials may request funding to 
“buy out” homes or neighborhoods prone to hazardous or repetitive flooding.48 
Until very recently, FEMA was completely reactive, offering no proactive 
solutions.49 In August 2020, FEMA and HUD announced unprecedented 
funding for managed retreat designed to move communities from flood zones 
before the next major weather event occurs.50 Still, even with this new funding 
and a shifted focus to proactive relocation, states and local governments must 
continue to rely on the buyout framework.51 The limitations of this framework 
are described below.  
Under the buyout system, state and local governments are responsible for 
determining which homes or areas are eligible for a buyout, which often include 
residential properties located in areas designated by FEMA as “Special Flood 
Hazard Areas.”52 If FEMA agrees with the state’s and/or local government’s 
determination, it will usually require the state or municipality to contribute 25% 
of the property acquisition costs, with FEMA supplying the remaining 75%.53 
Eligible homeowners are offered “pre-disaster fair-market value” for the 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Programs to Support Disaster Survivors, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/disaster-survivors (Jan. 25, 2021). 
 48. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, For Communities Plagued by Repeated Flooding, 
Property Acquisition May Be the Answer (May 28, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20180417114512/ 
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2014/05/28/communities-plagued-repeated-flooding-property-acquisition-
may-be-answer. 
 49. See McDonnell, supra note 40. 
 50. Christopher Flavelle, U.S. Flood Strategy Shifts to ‘Unavoidable’ Relocation of Entire Neighborhoods, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/climate/flooding-relocation-managed-
retreat.html. It should also be noted that the federal government has pushed local officials to exercise eminent 
domain to force resistant homeowners from their property in flood-prone areas or forfeit federal assistance with 
relocation efforts. Christopher Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from Flood 
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/climate/government-land-eviction-
floods.html [hereinafter Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from Flood Zones].  
 51. Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from Flood Zones, supra note 50; 
see also Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilient-infrastructure-communities (last visited Apr. 19, 
2021). 
 52. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Fact Sheet: Acquisition of Property After a Flood 
Event (Nov. 13, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20200706012204/https://www.fema.gov/news-release/ 
2018/11/13/fact-sheet-acquisition-property-after-flood-event [hereinafter FEMA Fact Sheet]. A Special Flood 
Hazard Area has “special flood, mudflow or flood-related erosion hazards” and appears in a designated zone on 
FEMA’s Flood Hazard Boundary Map or Flood Insurance Rate Map. Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), FED. 
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/glossary/special-flood-hazard-area-sfha (July 7, 2020). 
 53. Press Release, supra note 48. 
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home,54 which is then typically razed and the land is subsequently “restored to 
open space” to buffer the coastal area from future flooding.55  
On average, it takes over 5.5 years from the time of the disaster for a FEMA 
buyout to close.56 According to a study of recent buyouts, the affected residents 
have long ago had to relocate and stabilize before seeing any compensation for 
the property.57 Between 1989 and 2017, FEMA funded over 43,000 buyouts for 
properties prone to chronic flooding, but the number of properties included in 
each buyout purchase has steadily decreased.58 The result is a piecemeal retreat 
from coastal flood zones, “miss[ing] opportunities to more strategically restore 
floodplains and reduce overall flood risk.”59 
The buyout system has also faced criticism for perceived inequities.60 As 
discussed above, municipalities must initiate and administer the buyout process, 
and states and municipalities are expected to contribute 25% of the costs.61 
Studies suggest that localities with higher average income and education levels 
are more likely to administer buyouts, likely due to both funding issues and local 
government capacity to initiate and administer the buyout.62 Some warn that 
poor, rural communities without strong governmental infrastructure are 
particularly vulnerable to the risks associated with remaining in high flood 
areas.63  
In fact, the populations of communities deemed most vulnerable to climate 
disasters by the Centers for Disease Control are, on average, 81% minority.64 
Within the counties that administer buyouts, the properties involved are usually 
in lower-income, racially diverse areas.65 While this could mean that 
marginalized populations are benefitting more from the buyouts, it could also 
mean that counties are using the buyouts to selectively remove these 
communities. According to a study of recent FEMA buyouts, it is unclear 
“whether white residents are relocating away from areas of racial diversity or 
whether people of color are relocated.”66 Because FEMA does not keep data of 
 
 54. FEMA Fact Sheet, supra note 52. 
 55. Katharine J. Mach, Caroline M. Kraan, Miyuki Hino, A.R. Siders, Erica M. Johnston & Christopher B. 
Field, Managed Retreat Through Voluntary Buyouts of Flood-Prone Properties, 5 SCI. ADVANCES, Oct. 2019, 
at 1, 1. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. at 1. 
 61. Press Release, supra note 48. 
 62. Mach et al., supra note 55, at 3. 
 63. Id. at 6. 
 64. Thomas Frank, Population of Top 10 Counties for Disasters: 81% Minority, E&E NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE 
(June 8, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2020/06/08/stories/1063347205. 
 65. Mach et al., supra note 55, at 6. 
 66. Id. 
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homeowner identity, it is challenging to meaningfully analyze these equity 
issues.67  
The recent buyout study warns that “when social equity is not explicit [in 
buyout programs], inequitable implementation practices . . . may occur.”68 
These can include political pressures to allocate resources to the privileged 
instead of marginalized people, perceptions of coercion among buyout 
recipients, “deliberate findings of substantial damage in socially vulnerable 
areas, or relocations to areas with equal flood risk and greater social 
vulnerability.”69 The study urges that closer evaluation of administered buyout 
programs is essential to ensuring that buyouts are equitable going forward.70  
Additionally, because of the increase in frequency and magnitude of 
natural disasters, FEMA has seen unprecedented demand over the last decade, 
with eight of its most expensive years occurring between 2009 and 2019.71 Many 
argue that FEMA has awarded too much support for small scale disasters which 
states and local governments were well-equipped to handle on their own, leaving 
a shortage of resources and personnel when major disasters strike.72 For 
example, when Hurricanes Irma, Harvey, and Maria hit the United States in 
2017, “almost half of the agency’s emergency workforce was tied up when the 
first sheets of rain began to inundate large parts of Texas,” a pattern that FEMA 
admits is a continuing issue.73 Limitations on FEMA’s ability to respond to 
multiple disasters at once are bound to continue as natural disasters become more 
and more frequent and destructive.  
Relatedly, the cost to buy out all thirteen million Americans in flood-prone 
areas could cost the government up to $13 trillion.74 And while not all thirteen 
million people are in immediate danger, the number of displaced persons will 
continue to climb as coastal communities experience more severe high tide 
flooding and catastrophic storm surge resulting from rising sea levels.75 The 
Department of Homeland Security anticipates that “disaster survivors may have 
recovery needs that cannot be fully met by traditional government programs due 
to eligibility or program limitations.”76 In response, it has created the Unmet 
Needs Committee to centralize private organizations that can assist recovery 
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where the government is unable.77 However, there are no guarantees that private 
organizations can or will fill the voids left by a federal system strapped by 
growing demand.  
2. HUD Program 
HUD offers both a mortgage insurance program and a community grant 
program to the disaster response framework. HUD offers mortgage insurance to 
“lenders against the risk of default on mortgages to qualified disaster victims.”78 
For those whose homes are located in a presidentially designated disaster area, 
“[i]nsured mortgages may be used to finance the purchase or reconstruction of a 
one-family home that will be the principal residence of the homeowner.”79 These 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured mortgages enjoy at least a 
ninety-day moratorium on foreclosures to assist borrowers during disaster 
recovery, and may be eligible for a waiver of other late fees.80  
Additionally, after a presidentially declared disaster, “Congress may 
appropriate additional funding for the Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG),” which provides flexibility to local and state governments for a range 
of recovery efforts, especially for low-income areas.81 However, receiving 
funding through CDBG can be slow, because the program was not created as a 
permanent disaster relief mechanism.82 As a result, HUD must “essentially 
design a new program from scratch” for each new disaster related grant.83 
Congress introduced legislation in 2019 to make the HUD disaster relief 
program permanent to help alleviate this problem.84 
3. Small Business Administration Program 
The SBA can also provide funding for disaster relief to both businesses and 
private individuals.85 SBA offers low-interest, long-term loans to affected 
individuals who cannot qualify for credit elsewhere.86 Loans up to $200,000 are 
available for repair or replacement of primary homes, and loans up to $40,000 
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are available to replace personal property after a disaster.87 SBA also offers loans 
up to $2 million to businesses and nonprofits for disaster-related “losses not fully 
covered by insurance or other means.”88 Economic Injury Disaster Loans may 
be offered regardless of whether the business suffered any physical damage, and 
could be used to fortify the business against the risk of future disaster related 
damage.89 
4. National Flood Insurance Program 
Another federal avenue for individual relief is the National Flood Insurance 
Program, which “provides flood insurance to property owners, renters and 
businesses . . . . [and] works with communities required to adopt and enforce 
floodplain management regulations.”90 Despite the availability of this program, 
“roughly one-third of American homeowners in flood-prone cities have flood 
insurance.”91 Many cite the cost of flood insurance as a prohibitive factor.92 Even 
those who do have insurance are often left with inadequate compensation.  
For example, after the disastrous Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 
2005, Louisiana estimated that the average homeowner received almost $6 
thousand less than the value of their insurance claim.93 This led “to an extra $900 
million [in] losses for 160,000 families,” a sizeable bill that the federal 
government was unable (or unwilling) to foot.94 Unable to recover, many 
residents never returned to the city.95 A year after Katrina hit, the population of 
New Orleans had decreased from 484,674 to roughly 230,172—a population 
loss of over 50%.96 The National Flood Insurance Program is ill-equipped to fill 
the gap in flood insurance coverage and claims payouts, operating at an average 
net loss of $1.4 billion per year.97 
B. COMMUNITY RELOCATION EFFORTS 
While many communities face retreat because of destructive coastal 
storms, others—mostly Native American and Alaskan communities—face the 
permanent and inevitable loss of their land.98 However, only two, Isle de Jean 
Charles in Louisiana and Newtok in Alaska, have received support from the 
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federal government.99 As a result, localities have attempted a number of other 
responses to relocation, including attempts to hold private actors accountable for 
costs, as well as attempts at infrastructural fixes to delay the necessities of 
relocation.  
Subpart 1 below describes the government-supported relocations of Isle de 
Jean Charles and Newtok. Subpart 2 describes a private buyout administered by 
Shell following widespread chemical contamination in Diamond, Louisiana. 
Subpart 3 describes the unsuccessful attempt to hold private actors liable for 
relocation costs in Kivalina, Alaska. It then gives a short description of ongoing 
efforts to utilize public nuisance law to hold private actors accountable. Subpart 
4 briefly describes the predicament facing Tangier Island, Virginia, where 
infrastructural costs of remaining on the island will likely prove prohibitive. 
These attempts to relocate or fortify communities, and the challenges posed by 
each, illustrate the need to develop a comprehensive governmental approach to 
relocation. 
1. Government Relocations: Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana, & Newtok, 
Alaska  
Isle de Jean Charles is a town of about ninety-nine100 members of the 
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Native American tribe.101 Since 1960, the island 
has lost over ninety-eight percent of its land.102 The only road connecting the 
town to the mainland—and critical emergency services and infrastructure—has 
become completely exposed to water on either side.103 What used to be thick 
marsh has washed away, leaving the small island’s escape route susceptible to 
immediate flooding with any substantial storm event.104 The island, which 
became home to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw because of the violent Indian 
Removal Act, will soon be uninhabitable.105 The Indian Removal Act forced 
Native American tribes to relocate and forfeit millions of acres of their land.106 
Now, due to the devastating effects of climate change-induced sea level rise, the 
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw face the injustice of having to relocate once again. 
Through the Isle de Jean Charles Resettlement Project (“the Project”), the United 
States is funding and administering the wholesale relocation of the island 
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community to a more inland location.107 HUD granted $48.3 million dollars to 
the Project following its application to the National Disaster Resilience 
Competition in 2014.108 
The Project’s goal is to “construct[] a brand-new town and fill[] it with the 
displaced occupants and culture of Isle de Jean Charles.”109 While the 
government has provided the funding, at the cost of about $487,000 per person, 
logistical challenges have prevented Isle de Jean Charles from making 
substantial progress.110 Finding a new location that will provide enough of an 
economy to support the residents is a major challenge, especially because peace 
and quiet, and retaining a sense of community, are paramount to the island’s 
residents.111 Implementing a plan or process has proven difficult, raising the 
question of “whether government-backed community resettlements will be 
feasible for the hundreds of communities that are approaching similar 
dissolutions.”112 
Unlike Isle de Jean Charles, the town of Newtok, Alaska, has a fairly 
concrete plan for its relocation.113 Newtok, home to about 315 residents,114 had 
plans well underway by the time it received federal assistance.115 “[R]apidly 
losing land to a combination of erosion and thawing permafrost,” it is expected 
to become uninhabitable “within a matter of years.”116 The town traded land with 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 2003 for a site further inland from the 
existing village, and plans to use retrofitted military barracks to reduce 
construction costs.117 The 2018 federal budget bill allocated $15 million dollars 
to the Denali Commission,118 an independent federal agency created in 1998 to 
bolster Alaska’s infrastructure and utilities and provide economic support.119 
The funding will help Newtok to build twenty-eight houses at the new location, 
but the total cost of relocation is estimated to exceed $100 million, and the $15 
million in funding is only a one-time provision that will not renew.120 
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2. Individual Buyouts: Diamond, Louisiana 
Isle de Jean Charles and Newtok are exceptional in that most “prior 
resettlements . . . have largely followed a model of individual buyouts.”121 In the 
case of Diamond, Louisiana, the Shell Oil Company, whose chemicals factory 
caused leaks and explosions for decades, provided a buyout deal that offered a 
lump-sum payment for residents to move elsewhere.122 “One by one, the 
residents of Diamond took the money and left,” resulting in the total 
disembodiment of the historically Black community there.123 The loss of 
Diamond highlights the “difference between saving a community and saving its 
individual members,”124 the difference between individual buyouts and 
wholesale relocation of communities.125 Furthermore, private entities are 
unlikely to be a dependable option, as illustrated by the prolonged litigation 
surrounding the relocation of Kivalina, Alaska.  
3. Public Nuisance Claims: Kivalina, Alaska 
The Native Inupiat village of Kivalina, Alaska, home to roughly 400 
residents, has historically depended on formations of sea ice to protect it from 
coastal storms.126 The sea ice has become progressively less durable, forming 
later and melting earlier each season.127 Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corporation explains that this diminished protection, when 
combined with sea level rise and progressive erosion, results in “future storms 
threaten[ing] buildings and critical infrastructure in [Kivalina] with imminent 
devastation.”128 In 2008, Kivalina filed suit against several fossil fuel 
companies, seeking damages of $400 million for relocation of the village.129 The 
complaint alleged that the companies’ emissions of greenhouse gases 
contributed considerably to global warming and caused “substantial and 
unreasonable interference” with their right “to use and enjoy public and private 
property in Kivalina.”130 
In a motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs raised 
claims involving nonjusticiable political questions.131 They also argued that 
Kivalina lacked standing because the requisite causal link between the injuries 
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to Kivalina and the defendants’ emissions was too attenuated.132 The district 
court agreed with both arguments and granted the motion.133 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal on different grounds.134 Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Massachusetts v. EPA and American Electric Power v. 
Connecticut,135 the Ninth Circuit held that Kivalina’s federal common law claim 
had been displaced by the Clean Air Act, which empowers the EPA to regulate 
emissions of greenhouse gases.136 It concluded that the existing regulatory 
framework occupied the field, precluding federal common law nuisance 
claims.137 The Supreme Court declined to hear the final appeal in 2013.138 
Nonetheless, many of these nuisance claims have moved to state court.  
a. Continuing Efforts at Court-Awarded Compensation 
The challenges of federal preemption and of proving causation in common 
law public nuisance claims will continue to pose roadblocks to court-awarded 
compensation to relocate. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have begun bringing nuisance 
claims in state court in an attempt to work around federal displacement issues.139 
In California, the cities of San Francisco and Oakland brought state law public 
nuisance claims against major oil companies seeking compensation for projected 
infrastructural costs incurred due to rising sea levels.140 The cases were 
consolidated and removed to federal court, where they were dismissed.141 The 
court held that plaintiffs’ state law claims were controlled by federal common 
law because of their “international scope,” and because “the anticipated coastal 
flooding is uniquely federal” since it involves the flooding of “the navigable 
waters of the United States.”142 In the dismissal order, Judge Alsup of the 
Northern District of California explained that the claims “undoubtedly implicate 
the interests of countless governments, both foreign and domestic,” and as a 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 858. 
 135. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that the “Clean Air Act authorizes the 
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions”); see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 
(2011) (holding that “the Clean Air Act and the Environmental Protection Agency action the Act 
authorizes . . . displace” federal common-law public nuisance claims). 
 136. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857–58. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 569 U.S. 1000 (2013) (denying certiorari); see also 
Kivalina Lawsuit (Re Global Warming), supra note 129.  
 139. Kurtis Alexander, San Francisco, Oakland Sue Major Oil Companies over Rising Seas, S.F. GATE 
(Sept. 20, 2017, 9:15 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/San-Francisco-Oakland-sue-major-oil-
companies-12215044.php. 
 140. Id. 
 141. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting motion 
to dismiss). 
 142. Id. at 1021. 
April 2021] THE WATER IS COMING 1295 
result deserve “a solution on a more vast scale than can be supplied by a district 
judge or jury in a public nuisance case.”143  
Despite this judicial treatment, attorneys for three localities in California 
have brought separate actions in state court against big oil companies under 
creative new theories of nuisance, negligence, and products liability.144 In 2018, 
Judge Chhabria granted remand after defendants removed the cases to federal 
court, concluding that “federal common law does not govern the plaintiffs’ 
claims” and “does not preclude them from asserting the state law claims in these 
lawsuits.”145 It is possible that creative lawyering may nudge the courts toward 
awarding relief for climate related damages. However, the long-term success of 
public nuisance suits to remedy the damages associated with climate change and 
sea level rise remains unclear. Nor can any future victories in the courts 
guarantee relocation for the most marginalized populations, or that any sense of 
cultural cohesion will be retained. As such, the problem requires other avenues 
for immediate relief.  
4. Infrastructural Solutions: Tangier Island, Virginia 
Finally, many communities like Tangier Island, Virginia, have turned to 
infrastructural solutions to allow them to remain on their disappearing lands.146 
However, this option will all too frequently be cost prohibitive; the Army Corp 
of Engineers estimated that coastal engineering to provide a temporary fix would 
cost Tangier about $30 million.147 Costs continue to accrue while maintaining 
and repairing any temporary, infrastructural solution. And while smaller 
communities grapple with how and when to relocate, securing funding and 
making such decisions becomes more difficult “when sea-level rise knocks on 
the door of a major U.S. city like Miami,” says scholar Casey McCormack.148 
The Department of Homeland Security acknowledges that “[s]ome 
communities . . . may conclude that success requires relocating all or some 
portion of the community assets and restoring vacated areas to a more natural, 
predevelopment environment” rather than rebuilding in place.149 Still, says 
Michael Isaac Stein, “despite its inevitability, there is no official framework [in 
the U.S.] to handle this displacement [and] no U.S. government agency, process, 
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or funding dedicated to confronting” the imminent mass migration of Americans 
as the sea continues to rise.150 
Acknowledging the steep limitations inherent in the current U.S. approach 
to community relocation, this Note now turns to existing national and 
international policies toward internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Part 
below will emphasize aspects of IDP policy that may prove useful if 
meaningfully and proactively applied to environmentally displaced persons 
(EDPs).  
III.  INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS POLICIES 
Governments and the United Nations have struggled with how to classify 
EDPs, who face displacement because of environmental factors.151 The United 
Nations defines IDPs as those “who have been forced or obliged to . . . leave 
their homes . . . in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State 
border.”152 While natural disasters are included in this definition, most IDP 
policies focus on violence and human rights violations, and completely ignore 
IDPs facing displacement because of sea level rise or other permanent, but 
relatively slowly progressing, environmental factors.153 So, while EDPs face 
many of the same challenges as IDPs—permanent relocation, economic 
instability, and loss of community—they do not fit neatly into international 
humanitarian conceptions.154 For purposes of this Note, I will not argue which 
formalistic title should be applied to EDPs because, in McCormack’s words, 
these “technical, definitional nuances . . . are irrelevant to the millions of 
Americans” facing imminent relocation as a result of sea level rise and other 
climate related natural disasters.155 Rather, I will examine how current domestic 
and international frameworks for handling IDPs can be useful to the situation in 
the United States, and where the United States needs to improve in order to meet 
its own commitments to IDPs and to achieve the goals provided by the U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“U.N. Guiding Principles” or 
“Principles”).156 
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A. U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
The U.N. Guiding Principles were originally created in 1998 under the 
direction of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and updated in 2004.157 
The Principles are intended to provide governments and international 
development and humanitarian agencies with standards for providing 
“protection and assistance during displacement, and [to] set forth guarantees for 
safe return, resettlement and reintegration,” regardless of whether the 
reintegration occurs in the original locale or in a new location within the State.158 
They identify the rights and guarantees that should be afforded to IDPs as well 
as the responsibilities of national governments to IDPs within their borders.159 
The Principles are not legally binding.160 However, their content originates in 
binding concepts of international human rights, humanitarian law, and refugee 
law, and, according to the Brookings Institution, “they have come to 
acquire . . . a good deal of international standing and moral authority.”161 Many 
countries and organizations, including the United States, have adopted some 
version of the Principles to guide policy choices.162 The following paragraphs 
will highlight aspects of the principles significant to the analysis of how the 
United States should apply IDP policies to domestic EDPs. 
First and foremost, the U.N. Guiding Principles are clear: “National 
authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and 
humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their 
jurisdiction.”163 This sets the standard that national governments, rather than 
individuals or local governments, must lead the way in providing safeguards to 
IDPs. Authorities are to provide proper accommodation; safe conditions with 
proper nutrition, health and hygiene; and ensure that all possible steps are taken 
to prevent the separation of families.164 The Principles state that authorities 
should involve the affected IDPs “in the planning and management of their 
relocation,” and provide an effective remedy for contested decisions.165 
Furthermore, the Principles say states are under a particular obligation to protect 
against the displacement of indigenous people, minorities, and other groups with 
a special dependency on and attachment to the land.166 
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Importantly, IDPs have the right to “be protected against forcible return 
to . . . any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.”167 
Authorities must allow IDPs voluntary return to their home, but must also 
facilitate their resettlement and integration elsewhere in the country.168 These 
principles highlight the national government’s responsibility to allow IDPs the 
freedom to choose, while also providing them with a feasible alternative to 
returning to an uninhabitable area. This should include encouraging and 
supporting IDPs in seeking employment opportunities and engaging in gainful 
economic activity.169 Finally, governments have a “duty and responsibility to 
assist” IDPs in recovering property and possessions or assist them in obtaining 
compensation or fair reparations for their losses.170  
Although the U.N. Guiding Principles suggest policies to assist IDPs, the 
framework is fairly general and its application can mean many things. Below, I 
will briefly explain U.S. policy regarding IDPs before engaging with the African 
Union’s Kampala Convention, the “first binding multilateral instrument 
dedicated to the implementation of the Guiding Principles.”171 
B. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IDPS 
In response to the U.N. Guiding Principles, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) created the USAID Assistance to Internally 
Displaced Persons Policy (“the U.S. Policy”) in 2004.172 The U.S. Policy affirms 
many of the basic premises outlined in the U.N. Guiding Principles, recognizing 
the urgency of the global situation regarding IDPs and affirming the “ultimate 
goal . . . to enable IDPs to become fully productive contributors to economic and 
social progress in their local communities and countries.”173 Strikingly, the U.S. 
Policy focuses almost, if not completely exclusively, on the issue of IDPs 
abroad, promising humanitarian and strategic support without mentioning the 
application of these processes domestically.174 The document states that 
“USAID will encourage the governments of affected countries to fulfill their 
responsibilities to protect and assist their own citizens,”175 perhaps suggesting 
that the document’s authors did not think IDP’s a significant policy problem for 
the U.S. The agency assigned to create the U.S. Policy, the Agency for 
International Development, suggests the same.  
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Nonetheless, the policy has some strengths. It identifies distinct phases of 
displacement: (1) the initial emergency phase, requiring immediate 
humanitarian aid for essential provisions of food, housing, and healthcare; (2) 
the care and maintenance phase, requiring access to legal documents, education, 
and tools to support self-reliance; (3) the transitional reintegration phase, 
requiring transportation and infrastructural support; and (4) the long-term 
development phase, requiring repairs and improvements to existing systems.176  
The accompanying USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons 
Policy Implementation Guidelines (“Implementation Guidelines”) give greater 
detail to the technical aspects of the policy framework.177 The Implementation 
Guidelines identify an additional stage in the displacement process: the pre-
emergency preparedness phase.178 During this phase, “proper steps include early 
warning and monitoring systems, mechanisms for information 
exchange . . . [and] assessments and strengthening of response capacity.”179  
The Implementation Guidelines encourage a number of interrelated 
approaches to all relocation phases.180 One approach is community-based 
programming, emphasizing active participation in relocation efforts including 
“rehabilitation, social justice and reconciliation, social and economic wellbeing, 
good governance, and local democratic participation.”181 Another approach is 
strategic planning, which includes establishing “provisions to prevent, address, 
and mitigate population displacements.”182 A major strength of these aspects of 
the Implementation Guidelines is their emphasis on proactivity. They promote 
planning to allow the relocation process to be more informed and community-
centric, and to minimize the potential negative effects of weather events on at-
risk populations.183 These are tangible policy directives that, if adapted to the 
unique issues faced by EDPs in the United States, provide a strong foundation 
to remedy the shortcomings of the U.S. framework for EDPs. 
While the United States has no federal laws regarding treatment of IDPs, 
representatives in the House and the Senate introduced the Climate Displaced 
Persons Act (“the Act”) in 2019.184 The Act aims to create a new program 
separate from the federal refugee program to process a minimum of 50,000 
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climate migrants each year.185 It would also require the State Department “to 
create a Global Climate Resilience Strategy,” bringing climate change issues to 
the forefront of U.S. foreign policy.186 Furthermore, the Act would also call on 
the executive branch to keep data on the number of EDPs created by drought, 
sea level rise, and extreme weather conditions, to be reported annually to 
Congress.187 While the Act is revolutionary in that it brings climate change 
directly into U.S. policy and forces acknowledgement of global EDPs, like the 
U.S. Policy toward IDPs, it focuses on EDPs from other countries and does little 
in the way of creating an infrastructure or response system for domestic EDPs.188  
While these policy initiatives in the United States show stirrings around the 
idea of EDPs, they do little to provide for the growing number of 
environmentally displaced persons already in the United States, and for the many 
thousands more to come. Discouragingly, while the U.N. General Assembly 
adopted The Global Compact for Migration in December 2018 with approval by 
152 countries, the United States voted against the accord, joining only three 
countries opposing.189 The accord acknowledges the growing influence of 
climate change on migration patterns and is intended to provide “for safe, 
orderly and regular migration.”190 
C. KAMPALA CONVENTION 
In 2009, the African Union adopted the African Union Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known 
as the Kampala Convention.191 Africa has the largest population of IDPs in the 
world, and the Kampala Convention is the first binding multilateral legal 
instrument adopted for the purpose of effectuating the U.N. Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement.192 The Kampala Convention is intended to address 
internal displacement from all causes, including natural disasters.193 Despite 
critiques that the Kampala Convention lacks enforcement mechanisms, its 
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“innovative and interesting” provisions provide useful guidance in several 
areas.194  
Like the U.S. Policy toward IDPs, the Kampala Convention embraces most 
of the core principles from the U.N. Guiding Principles.195 The Kampala 
Convention affirms that each African state “bear[s] the primary duty and 
responsibility” to protect and assist IDPs, which includes a special responsibility 
to “communities with special attachment to, and dependency on land.”196 
Additionally, as stipulated in the U.N. Guiding Principles, the Kampala 
Convention makes states responsible for providing effective remedies for 
displacement, including “just and fair compensation and other forms of 
reparations . . . for damage incurred as a result of displacement.”197 
Furthermore, it provides that states should allow IDPs the free and informed 
choice of “whether to return, integrate locally or relocate” and should assist them 
“in finding sustainable solutions” following displacement.198 
The more novel aspects of the Kampala Convention include a liability 
mechanism for private entities and a directive to adopt policies and create an 
authority to handle IDPs.199 State parties are to “ensure the accountability of 
non-State actors . . . including multinational companies and private military or 
security companies,” as well as those “non-state actors involved in the 
exploration and exploitation of economic and natural resources leading to 
displacement.”200 These liability mechanisms for non-state actors are novel to 
the discussion of IDP policy, especially as it concerns climate induced 
migration. Additionally, the Kampala Convention directs the states to codify the 
obligations of the Kampala Convention into their own laws, to “designate an 
authority or body” to protect and assist IDPs, and to “adopt . . . strategies and 
policies on internal displacement at national and local levels.”201  
Below, I will analyze how these novel aspects of IDP policy, as well as the 
strengths of the policies shared among the U.N. Guiding Principles, the U.S. 
Policy on IDPs, and the Kampala Convention can inform a more robust, 
sustainable model for the treatment of EDPs in the United States.  
IV.  APPLYING IDP POLICIES TO CLIMATE DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
There are several ways in which the U.N. Guiding Principles and the 
Kampala Convention can fortify existing U.S. policy toward EDPs and inform 
new policies to handle the ever-growing number of people evacuating from the 
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coasts. While EDPs may not fall neatly into the traditional concept of IDPs, they 
should be afforded the same protections as IDPs, and the United States should 
be proactive about relocation efforts in areas at high risk of sea level rise and 
storm related devastation. Subpart A below discusses ways in which the United 
States is not meeting its responsibilities to EDPs and suggests some potential 
solutions drawn from IDP policy. Subpart B, also drawing on IDP policy, 
provides more general recommendations for structuring the U.S. response to 
environmental displacement beyond meeting its express obligations under the 
U.N. Guiding Principles.  
A. OBLIGATIONS UNDER U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
There are several ways in which the United States is falling short of its 
obligations under the U.N. Guiding Principles. Namely, U.S. policy toward 
EDPs is lacking in its treatment of indigenous peoples, its efforts to effectively 
integrate EDPs into local economies, and in providing compensation to EDPs 
for their losses.  
1. Protection of Indigenous People 
The United States is not meeting its obligations under the U.N. Guiding 
Principles to protect indigenous people, minorities, and those “with a special 
dependency on and attachment to their lands.”202 Of the at least seventeen mostly 
native communities seeking permanent relocation in the United States,203 only 
two have received any federal support. In both instances, the funding was given 
as a one-off. For Isle de Jean Charles, it came as a result of a one-time 
competition to create sustainable responses to climate change,204 and for 
Newtok, the funding was a one-time grant through a federal agency.205 Many of 
the challenges with these attempted relocations relate to building or finding an 
economy at potential new locations capable of supporting the populations while 
still retaining the cultural hallmarks that are sacred to the displaced people.206  
The Kampala Convention recommends that relocation authorities should 
“consult internally displaced persons and allow them to participate in decisions 
relating to their protection and assistance.”207 Studies of successful climate 
related relocations in Fiji suggest that a participatory process involving 
community members throughout both planning and execution is essential.208 A 
case study involving the climate related relocations of Denimanu and 
Vunidogoloa, two villages in Fiji, shows that when residents feel that the 
community has made the choice to move, cultural and social cohesion and the 
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shared sense of community benefit.209 The study also showed that relocating 
within lands owned by the same group or family, called mataqali, was important 
to cultural preservation.210 This may suggest that relocations of indigenous 
people, or any other group that values cultural cohesion, may benefit from 
considering locations nearby to similar or related cultural resources. 
Additionally, the Fiji case study showed that allowing the community to self-
identify its priorities improved livelihood outcomes.211 As such, any policy 
towards EDPs going forward should include a participatory mechanism to 
actively engage relocating communities in each stage of the process. 
2. Economic Integration 
In regard to the maintenance and improvement of livelihoods, the United 
States is falling short of its obligation under the Guiding Principles to “facilitate 
the integration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.”212 IDPs 
have the right “to seek freely opportunities for employment and to participate in 
economic activities.”213 This relates to the necessity of providing an economy 
willing and ready to accept displaced persons. For example, one of the principal 
challenges faced by the Isle de Jean Charles Relocation Project has been finding 
an area with enough economic activity to support the financial security of the 
displaced population.214 To meet its obligation under the Guiding Principles, the 
United States will need to implement proactive solutions to facilitate economic 
integration for EDPs.  
The Fiji case study discussed above finds that targeted livelihood planning 
can effectively protect and improve livelihoods in a new location and urges the 
importance of ensuring that the necessary economic infrastructure is available 
there.215 According to the study, “in Vunidogoloa, the provision of livelihood 
alternatives . . . (such as pineapple plantations, fish ponds, and cattle) improved 
outcomes across natural and financial capital.”216 In the United States, similar 
efforts at livelihood planning could look like the creation of New Deal-style 
work projects such as those contemplated in the Green New Deal for relocating 
communities and individuals.217 The Green New Deal, a policy proposal brought 
forth by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the House of Representatives and Edward 
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J. Markey in the Senate, is designed to drastically reduce U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions and stimulate the economy through clean energy work projects.218 It 
sets out “to create millions of good, high-wage jobs in the United States” by 
forming work projects across the country to repair and upgrade existing 
infrastructure and build new, energy-efficient, and sustainable infrastructure.219 
Pairing Green New Deal employment projects with incentives to proactively 
relocate would benefit the preservation of livelihoods while addressing critical 
infrastructural weaknesses in coastal areas.220 Another option might be to 
arrange contracts with existing employers in or near relocation sites to ensure 
that a sufficient number of jobs are available for relocating individuals.  
3. Compensation for Losses 
Finally, the United States is failing its responsibility under the U.N. 
Guiding Principles to assist IDPs to either recover their property or to receive 
“appropriate compensation or . . . just reparation” for their losses.221 Those who 
do not receive FEMA buyouts must return to coastal areas with continuing risks 
to safety, property, and economic prosperity as rising sea levels and severe 
weather events continue to beleaguer coastal communities.222 Relatedly, the 
shortcomings of the buyout program also implicate the U.N. Guiding Principles 
duty to protect IDPs from “forcible return” to an area “where their life, safety, 
liberty and/or health would be at risk.”223 Despite these failures, the United 
States has indicated its commitment to IDPs abroad—“to enable IDPs to become 
fully productive contributors to economic and social progress,” and to assist in 
the long-term development phase of reintegrating IDPs into society.224 
Optimistically, with some changes, this commitment can be channeled towards 
the dire and growing situation for domestic EDPs.  
B. THE PATH FORWARD: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEANINGFUL 
PROTECTION OF EDPS 
While there is no simple answer to the issue of EDPs, some workable 
solutions to their problems—namely, lack of funding for relocation and 
reparations, piecemeal relocation resulting in fractured communities, and the 
challenge of reintegrating EDPs as productive members of the economy—can 
be drawn from the existing policy frameworks for IDPs. The Subparts below 
discuss the potential benefits of codifying liability for corporate actors, focusing 
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existing agency efforts to provide economic incentives for relocation, and 
creating a centralized agency or authority that utilizes centralized reporting.  
1. Funding and Codified Liability  
One of the ubiquitous challenges of relocating people, whether by 
individual buyouts or by wholesale relocation of a community, is funding. As 
discussed, FEMA’s budget and resources continue to be stretched beyond its 
means, as does the National Flood Insurance Program, which operates at a major 
annual deficit.225 Furthermore, as we saw from the Kivalina lawsuits, we cannot 
rely on private industry to help foot the bill, despite their disproportional 
contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions.226 This is partly because the 
existing judicial structure for nuisance claims requiring the showing of a causal 
link is not well suited to the reality of aggregated emissions, and partly due to 
federal common law preemption, as discussed above.227 The result is a glaring 
hole in holding private industry liable for their contributions to climate change. 
For example, according to the New York Times, we know that twenty of the 
largest international “fossil fuel companies are responsible for 35 percent of 
energy-related greenhouse gas emissions since 1965,”228 and that the cement 
industry alone contributes roughly eight percent of the world’s carbon dioxide 
emissions.229 Allowing these multinational actors to escape liability severely 
hinders the federal government’s ability to adequately compensate EDPs for 
their losses, at least without making major adjustments to federal budgetary 
choices.  
The Kampala Convention offers a radical solution to the issue of funding. 
It asserts that States (nations within the African Union) are to “ensure the 
accountability of non-State actors . . . including multinational companies 
and . . . non-state actors involved in the exploration and exploitation of 
economic and natural resources leading to displacement.”230 Furthermore, it 
directs states to codify these obligations into their respective bodies of law.231 
Codifying liability and financial obligations for major contributors to climate 
change and sea level rise would provide relief to financially strained federal 
programs. It would remedy the issue that holding these actors liable does not fit 
neatly into existing civil liability frameworks.232  
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Applying this aspect of the Kampala Convention to the U.S. framework for 
EDPs would not only assist in relocation efforts, but would also help the United 
States fulfill its obligation to provide compensation or reparations for 
displacement related losses. While lawmakers will certainly face challenges in 
crafting laws to hold corporate actors responsible, they might begin by targeting 
those corporations whose actions have had a direct effect on the land in their 
immediate vicinities of operation. In the Isle de Jean Charles example, 
irresponsible dredging by nearby oil companies was a major contributor to the 
loss of wetlands and “freshwater vegetation that held the land together.”233 
Diamond, Louisiana, discussed above, provides another example.234 There, 
Shell’s chemical leaks and explosions had a direct and immediate effect on the 
habitability of the surrounding area.235 A path toward more expansive corporate 
liability may begin with codifying liability in similar situations where there is 
strong evidence of causation and tangible effects on local communities.  
2. Existing Agencies and Economic Incentives for Relocation  
As discussed above, a major aspect of any successful relocation is 
implementing strategies to ensure that EDPs can successfully integrate into or 
create new economies in their areas of relocation.236 In the USAID framework 
for IDPs, this would likely fit into the long-term development phase.237 Long-
term economic stability will not be achieved simply by buying out individual 
homes or paying for the physical aspects of community relocation. It is not 
enough, even for the select few homeowners who are offered FEMA buyouts,238 
to be paid market value for their home, or to provide funding for the physical 
relocation of a community without providing for the economic infrastructure to 
sustain them in a new locale. These approaches do not account for the 
employment situations and financial stability that EDPs leave behind when they 
are displaced. In addition to the suggestions made above regarding livelihood 
planning and the Green New Deal,239 there are a number of ways that the existing 
framework of disaster relief agencies can assist with economic integration by 
providing incentives.  
For example, the SBA already offers loans to businesses following natural 
disasters, regardless of whether the business sustained any physical damage, to 
prepare the business for future disasters.240 The SBA could expand this incentive 
to encourage businesses to move further inland, to open in localities where EDPs 
are resettled, and to offer employment opportunities to EDPs. This could 
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stimulate economic activity for EDPs and alleviate one of the major challenges 
of relocation. HUD could also have a hand in this economic stimulation. The 
existing CDBG, which funds the rebuilding process in disaster affected areas,241 
could be adjusted to offer similar services to communities that seek to 
proactively relocate. HUD could offer employment opportunities to assist in the 
construction and infrastructure projects required for relocation, rather than 
simply responding to areas that have already been severely impacted. This would 
both encourage inland retreat and stimulate the economies of struggling EDP 
populations.  
Adjusting FEMA’s role in environmental displacement may also prove 
beneficial. It is an important first step that FEMA has publicly announced its 
aim “to categorically shift the federal focus away from reactive disaster spending 
and toward research-supported, proactive investment in community 
resilience.”242 Still, even with this notable policy update and accompanying 
funding, individuals cannot apply directly to FEMA for a buyout; rather, they 
must wait for their locality to request a buyout, and then hope that the locality 
chooses them as a recipient.243 Even more troubling is that studies show that 
wealthy areas are much more likely to participate in buyout programs, partially 
because the locality is responsible for twenty-five percent of the cost, and lower-
income areas are not always equipped to provide the funding.244 This serves to 
perpetuate issues of economic inequality, especially as they relate to EDPs.  
Considering the limited funding and resources that FEMA must spread 
amongst an ever-growing number of disasters,245 it is essential that FEMA, or 
any newly designated authority or agency, adopts a more proactive approach to 
mitigating the effects of natural disasters and sea level rise. Studies show that 
for “every $1 spent on hazard mitigation,” the nation can save “$6 in future 
disaster costs.”246 Critical to a more proactive approach is incentivizing 
individuals and communities to relocate before catastrophic sea level rise and 
weather events ravage the area, using some of the strategies outlined above 
through HUD and SBA. Increased funding from a codified liability framework 
for private actors could strongly support such initiatives.  
3. Proactive Centralized Agency or Authority 
The Kampala Convention also suggests a policy solution to the issues 
created by piecemeal relocation, either by individual buyouts or by progressive 
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retreat at the individual’s own behest.247 As part of each state’s obligation to 
assist IDPs to find sustainable solutions, the Kampala Convention suggests that 
states “designate an authority or body” for the task and “[a]dopt . . . strategies 
and policies on internal displacement at national and local levels.”248 This rather 
intuitive directive actually carries with it some significant policy implications. 
As discussed above, the responses of FEMA, HUD, and SBA are somewhat 
disaggregated, inefficient, and reactive. Designating a centralized authority to 
formulate policy and implement strategies for EDPs could be an effective way 
to consolidate existing frameworks in order to use resources more efficiently and 
expediently.249 The Denali Commission, discussed above in relation to 
relocation efforts in Newtok, Alaska, provides a strong example for creating an 
independent agency.250 The purpose behind its creation was to “provide critical 
utilities, infrastructure, and economic support” in Alaska and to acknowledge 
“the need for increased inter-agency cooperation and focus.”251 Similarly, a new 
agency focused on the needs of EDPs could help to consolidate existing agency 
efforts and allow for a more proactive focus on long-term, equitable economic 
integration and infrastructure.  
Creating a new agency or authority dedicated to the handling of EDPs 
could remedy some of the accountability problems that occur when 
responsibility is spread among multiple agencies and entities.252 A centralized 
agency or authority could prioritize a proactive response to displacement, 
encourage elective relocation for individuals and communities, and better 
organize the responses of existing agencies such as FEMA, HUD, and SBA. This 
authority could provide proactive analysis of potential vulnerabilities to coastal 
communities and help establish local mechanisms to monitor risks on an 
ongoing basis with both funding and expertise.253 This is consistent with 
Implementation Guidelines suggestion to create an early monitoring system.254 
The authority could also provide similar support in the planning and 
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implementation of relocation initiatives to offer expertise and to ensure that 
equitable considerations are addressed. A proactive agency could also encourage 
better management of floodplains and supplement the efforts of the National 
Flood Insurance Program.255 Finally, a new authority could establish 
mechanisms to facilitate active participation of community members in the 
relocation process, consistent with the Implementation Guidelines.256 
4. Centralized Reporting 
The directive to create a new authority would be well complemented by the 
proposed Climate Displaced Persons Act’s suggestion that the executive branch 
provide Congress with an annual report “on people displaced by extreme 
weather, drought and sea level rise,” and that the State Department create a 
Global Climate Resilience Strategy.257 Any such strategy should include 
existing disaster response while providing additional support in planning and 
implementation on a local level.  
The Kampala Convention directs states to “assess . . . the needs and 
vulnerabilities of internally displaced persons and of host communities.”258 To 
consider the needs of marginalized communities in relocation programs, as well 
as the infrastructural needs of the communities that will receive them, 
information must first be made available about existing trends and inequities. 
Centralized reporting and the study of relevant data would aid a new agency or 
authority to effectively execute existing strategies for disaster relief and to 
implement more proactive relocation strategies focused on retaining the essence 
of displaced communities, in contrast to the piecemeal relocation described 
above in Diamond, Louisiana.259  
Furthermore, centralized reporting is essential to creating a more robust 
understanding of the equity issues involved with buyout programs. As discussed 
above, FEMA does not keep data on homeowner identity, making it challenging 
to understand exactly how buyouts are affecting marginalized communities.260 
A centralized reporting mechanism will allow for a more thoughtful, equitable 
approach to the relocation process, on small and large scales. Additionally, to 
maximize the utility of centralized reporting, any new agency or authority should 
include a team of experts committed to studying the data and incorporating 
equitable considerations into buyout and relocation projects.261 A thorough 
understanding of existing data will be essential to creating successful strategies 
going forward.  
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CONCLUSION  
While localities and states need to adopt plans and funding for the growing 
number of EDPs in the United States, in USAID’s own words, “the primary 
responsibility for [the] welfare and protection [of IDPs] lies with the respective 
governing authorities” of affected countries.262 The United States has a 
responsibility to the growing number of domestic EDPs. Applying existing 
frameworks for handling IDPs to disaster response and relocation initiatives 
already underway will serve as a strong starting point for the United States to 
develop an infrastructure to handle this massive problem and to provide EDPs 
with the essential tools to successfully reintegrate into inland areas, away from 
the ever-rising sea. 
Given the inevitability of climate induced sea level rise, and the resulting 
changes to coastal areas in the United States, it is absolutely essential that the 
United States develop policies and infrastructural strategies to handle the 
millions of people who will continue to be permanently displaced from their 
homes and communities. The United States should be more proactive in its 
approach to EDPs. It should create an agency dedicated to the protection and 
treatment of EDPs that will centralize existing resources and disaster response. 
Furthermore, the United States should codify liability for private actors who 
have contributed to sea level rise and population displacement and provide 
economic stimulus incentives to assist with the relocation and reintegration of 
EDPs from coastal areas. These initiatives will make existing frameworks more 
efficient and ensure that the United States meets its responsibilities to EDPs as 
outlined in the U.N. Principles.  
It remains for other scholars to explore what policies localities and states 
should adopt to accommodate sea level rise and migration. Important work also 
remains to address how fires and other natural disasters will contribute to the 
policy needs of EDPs in the United States, and what pressures climate migration 
will assert on the inland areas receiving EDPs.263 In California, annual fire 
seasons have gotten progressively more destructive.264 Early in the 2020 fire 
season, California had already broken the all-time record of 3.2 million acres 
burned.265 According to the New York Times, some 28 million Americans are 
likely to be affected by similar megafires in the coming decades.266 While this 
Note has addressed relocation mostly in the context of progressive sea level rise, 
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EDPs from fires and other natural disasters will certainly require the same 
treatment and consideration. This is especially true considering that an estimated 
11 million Californians, one out of every four, lives in a fire-prone area.267 
Scholarship is also emerging as to the impacts of EDPs immigrating to the 
United States.268 Some suggest that the United States should approach the issue 
of transborder EDPs from both a humanitarian and a national security 
standpoint, planning ahead to protect cultural identity and to ensure the 
expedient vetting of sudden influxes of EDPs from abroad following natural 
disaster events.269 Finally, important work remains to establish international 
consensus about the treatment of EDPs.270 Citing a “protection gap” for 
transborder EDPs due to the limitations of the U.N. definition of a refugee, 
scholar Jennifer Skinner suggests that the international community formally 
establish the application of the U.N. Guiding Principles to EDPs who are 
displaced internationally.271 These will remain important areas for study as our 
understanding of the severity of the impacts of anthropogenic climate change 
and sea levels continue to rise.  
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